International Equity ADR

Second Quarter 2026 Report

HARDING LOEVNER

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Performance

Total Return (%) Periods Ended June 30, 2026

	3 Months	YTD	1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years	Since Inception
HL International Equity ADR (Gross)	9.52	10.69	16.10	13.24	6.31	9.66	8.42
HL International Equity ADR (Net)	9.36	10.37	15.41	12.52	5.61	8.93	7.59
MSCI All Country World ex US Index	14.69	14.01	28.27	19.40	9.34	10.45	6.16
MSCI EAFE Index	11.08	9.84	20.80	17.00	9.60	10.19	5.84

Performance returns are of the composite. The composite performance returns shown are preliminary. Returns are annualized for periods greater than one year. The Since Inception date, December 31, 1989, corresponds to that of the linked International Equity composite. MSCI All Country World ex US Index, the benchmark index, and MSCI EAFE Index, the supplemental index, are shown gross of withholding taxes

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Invested capital is at risk of loss. Please read the above performance in conjunction with the disclosures on the last page of this report. All performance and data shown are in US dollar terms, unless otherwise noted.

What's on Our Minds

The rise of AI-related stocks has invited comparisons to the internet-related stocks in 1999–2000. Indeed, Information Technology (IT) stocks in the US and abroad have approached levels of relative performance not seen since late 1999. Is this a boom? Undoubtedly. But whether it is an AI bubble that could soon deflate is a more difficult question. AI-related stocks have risen at an extreme pace, but so too have the earnings of many of the companies behind them. The current and anticipated capital investment in AI data centers has been the force driving both. What kind of bubble could it be: A stock bubble, an earnings bubble, or a capital investment bubble?

These are the questions our investment team has been pursuing during this boom. Rather than imposing a single, top-down conclusion about the existence of an AI bubble, we have encouraged each member of our team to research, forecast, and judge the extent and durability of AI's effects on the businesses they know best. Our analysis is guided by our framework of competitive strategy and industry five-forces analysis. That framework suggests that the AI boom is not a uniform phenomenon. Durability within it will vary by company depending on industry structure, product differentiation, customer concentration, supply discipline, and the economics of the end demand being served.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing or TSMC, the most valuable company outside the US, possesses a widely admired business model. For decades it has gained share in logic chip manufacturing by continually investing to create economies of scale and scope, going farther down the manufacturing experience curve than peers, and developing proprietary manufacturing processes that deliver to customers the most advanced chips at costs competitors cannot match. Manufacturing logic chips for customers such as NVIDIA, Apple, and Qualcomm, TSMC has generally been able to grow its productive assets 10% to 20% annually over the last two decades, with returns on invested capital consistently above its cost of capital. Those returns are attractive, though not exceptionally high, typically ranging from 10% to 15%.

In response to rising demand for AI-related semiconductors, TSMC continues to expand capacity in its usual rational manner. As customers ask for ever more capacity, TSMC is pulling additional levers, and charging incrementally higher prices and recognizing higher margins in return. Higher costs and lower utilization rates at its relatively new US fabs remains a counterweight to margins. With supply constrained, TSMC's customer philosophy is to increase pricing sustainably through technological improvements, while still delivering incremental value to customers. Management contrasted this approach with the philosophy of memory semiconductor manufacturers, which have recently increased prices much more dramatically.

For decades, the business model of memory makers such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix has been far less admired than that of TSMC. The memory industry has historically been less consolidated than advanced logic manufacturing, and rivalry has been more intense. Memory makers, too, have invested in advanced production and economies of scale, yet the three dominant producers have historically had far less profit to show for it. While many of the most advanced logic chips can only be produced cost-effectively by TSMC, if at all, leaving TSMC with more than 85% market share among the most advanced chips, the most advanced memory chips can be produced by three large competitors, Samsung, SK hynix, and Micron. And while TSMC manufactures logic chips to unique customer specifications, much of the memory industry's production is still devoted to standardized, commodity-like products such as DDR5 and DDR4 memory.

Over the past year however, surging demand for the most advanced and difficult to manufacture high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips used in AI computing has dramatically improved memory-makers' bargaining position with customers. We hear that buyers are signing long-term contracts, both to secure current supply and to help fund and incentivize new HBM capacity. These deals, which are priced at well-above-average margins for the memory makers, have also contributed to a reallocation of production capacity away from commodity memory products such as DDR4, driving prices for such products sharply higher and further lifting memory-maker profits.

With memory demand ahead of supply in both AI and standard memory chips, industry profitability is set to rise to levels that were recently unimaginable, and well beyond what we expect from TSMC. Samsung's average cash flow return on invested capital over the past 10 years has been a modest 7%, with 2023 marking a trough of 2%, and its best year reaching 11%. We currently expect Samsung's CFROI to rise above 26% in 2026, delivering more than $170 billion of profit versus a prior peak of

Market Snapshot

- The IT sector rose 64% as memory and semiconductor companies saw material increases in reported and expected earnings due to AI-related demand. All other sectors lagged the index.
- Energy underperformed, as oil prices fell in anticipation of a resolution of the US-Iran conflict.
- Financial stocks, especially banks, gained as yield curves in many countries steepened reflecting risks that recent and potential monetary policy changes will prove insufficient to quell inflation unleashed from energy disruptions and continued AI capex.
- Emerging Markets were boosted by South Korea, which surged 87% due to the strength of Samsung Electronics and SK hynix.
- China underperformed, as lack of recovery in consumer spending hurt investor sentiment.

Index Performance (USD %)

MSCI ACWI ex US Index

Sector	2Q 2026	Trailing 12 Months
Communication Services	-2.7	-9.8
Consumer Discretionary	1.5	-4.5
Consumer Staples	4.2	3.6
Energy	-11.9	26.0
Financials	13.6	25.8
Health Care	2.5	9.2
Industrials	10.4	19.6
Information Technology	64.2	112.0
Materials	-1.2	31.1
Real Estate	2.8	1.5
Utilities	1.1	21.6

Region	2Q 2026	Trailing 12 Months
Canada	6.2	27.7
Emerging Markets	24.2	44.2
Europe EMU	14.9	20.9
Europe ex EMU	7.2	17.4
Japan	14.2	29.5
Middle East	4.7	19.0
Pacific ex Japan	3.7	12.5
MSCI ACWI ex US Index	14.7	28.3

Source: FactSet, MSCI Inc. Data as of June 30, 2026.

$42 billion in 2022. SK hynix has had an even bumpier history. Historically smaller and entirely focused on memory, its CFROI has averaged only 6%, with a low of -7% in 2023 before rising to an all-time high of 18% in 2025. We expect this to surge above 40% in 2026 on profits of more than $110 billion. For comparison, we expect TSMC to earn a record $76 billion in 2026. And a consensus has formed that memory profits will expand further in 2027 and 2028, a remarkable degree of optimism for an industry whose past cyclical downturns few investors could stomach.

Both TSMC's steadily growing profitability and memory makers' rapidly surging profitability depends on demand from a handful of key customers: the companies building and operating AI data centers. Hyperscalers such as Alphabet and Amazon are widely expected to invest sums of $400 billion or more annually for the foreseeable future. In the past, more modest data center investments were funded largely from the cashflows generated by already-established business models. Today, a growing share of AI infrastructure investment is being financed through new debt and equity issuance and is being built to serve new AI-related business models whose end economics are less well established.

If those end-use economics fail to deliver the anticipated return on data center investments, there could be a period of digestion of already built capacity, with hyperscalers slowing the pace of expansion. Even if end-use demand lives up to expectations, there are growing concerns about the physical constraints of securing sufficient land, power, and other infrastructure for announced data center construction plans, as well as the risk that regulators and voters could act to block potential negative externalities of data centers on their communities. Whatever the reason, data center construction delays would weigh on purchases of the semiconductors going into them.

Should semiconductor demand growth come off the boil, we suspect that past patterns of industry profitability will reassert themselves. TSMC is likely to continue growing sales and investments, but at a slower pace; margins could be steady to slightly lower, given the company's pricing contracts with customers. In memory, we expect margins for already contracted AI memory to hold firm, given current supply tightness and improved contract terms with buyers. But pricing of commodity-like memory chips, which still account for the majority of industry production, could revert toward its long-term downward trend as quickly as prices rose over the past year, pressuring overall margins. TSMC management recently noted to us that the semiconductor industry has "never experienced five consecutive strong years." The last down year for the industry was 2023, which suggests that 2028 may deserve particular scrutiny.

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The good news for semiconductor equipment suppliers is that virtually all semiconductor manufacturers, whether in logic or memory, remain committed to expanding capacity. High current and prospective profits should easily fund such capital expenditure. In addition to its record profits, SK hynix, the world's second-largest memory producer by revenue, plans to use funds from ADR issuance to purchase advanced lithography equipment, almost certainly supplied by ASML. Samsung has vowed to be more disciplined with memory capacity capital expenditure than it has been in the past, with indications that AI memory growth is being supported partly by reallocating commodity memory lines. Yet Samsung, too, will need increasingly advanced equipment to stay ahead of competitors. Micron has also suggested that its capex expansion will be tied to customer demand and directed toward AI memory.

Statements of disciplined capacity growth from the three largest memory makers suggest that prices and margins could stay higher for longer than in past decades. Still, the same customer demand that has pushed semiconductor demand growth well ahead of supply growth is now incentivizing capacity additions that should eventually bring utilization into better balance. For the companies, such investments may be rational. For the stocks, it could prove more complicated. Scarcity has been a powerful driver of recent earnings growth and investor enthusiasm. If capacity catches up, the balance of enthusiasm may shift as well.

Portfolio in Focus

The astounding surge in semiconductor profits has had an equally dramatic effect on the semiconductor industry group's stock prices, and on our portfolio as well. ASML offers a useful example of the valuation challenge created by that surge. Our analyst's fair value estimate for ASML, derived from our discounted cash flow modeling, was just above its share price in late December, signaling little valuation risk despite strong share price gains last year. Since then, ASML reported 2025 earnings of nearly 10 billion euros, and indicated that voracious demand for its semiconductor equipment would continue to rise. This year our analyst's forecast for 2030 earnings has climbed from approximately €25 billion to €37 billion, boosting her fair value estimate by 40%, a generous increase that has been far outpaced by the stock's soaring share price, given 53% gains in the quarter and 83% year-to-date.

Meanwhile, other stocks we follow in the sector (and in the case of Samsung, would have owned, if it had a registered ADR) are even more challenging. Samsung's share price has risen 156% year-to-date while its price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple using forward earnings has roughly halved, but that apparent cheapening is misleading. Samsung's share price has risen nearly four-fold in the past twelve months; the multiple has only fallen because near-term earnings expectations have risen even faster. For cyclical businesses, as we firmly believe the semiconductor industry remains, snapshot valuation ratios can give the most reassuring signals when profits are closest to their peak. A more comprehensive view, which incorporates not only the near-term surge but also the likely mean reversion of profits in later years, paints a more sober picture of the valuation risk embedded in its stock price.

One tenet of behavioral finance is that investors often become too eager to reduce risk in a position of gain, while becoming too willing to tolerate risk in a position of loss. That disposition effect was understood long before Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky named it, with the aphorism of "Cut your losses, run your profits" a bit of well-established traders' arcana in early 19th century London stock market lore.

Resisting the urge to sell winners too early is an under-appreciated discipline. But it is not an absolute rule. It needs to be balanced against valuation, concentration, and other risks.

Resisting the urge to sell winners too early is an under-appreciated discipline. But it is not an absolute rule. It needs to be balanced against valuation, concentration, and other risks. Our recent gradual trimming of several of our IT holdings reflects

Portfolio Positioning (% Weight)

Sector	HL	Index
Industrials	21.8	14.1
Health Care	12.5	6.9
Cash	3.1	–
Comm Services	5.5	4.3
Cons Staples	5.5	5.1
Cons Discretionary	7.3	7.4
Real Estate	0.0	1.3
Energy	2.7	4.4
Materials	4.3	6.4
Utilities	0.0	3.1
Info Technology	18.9	22.8
Financials	18.4	24.2



Region	HL	Index
Europe ex EMU	22.4	17.2
Japan	17.0	13.7
Cash	3.1	–
Europe EMU	23.7	20.9
Other	1.2	–
Middle East	1.2	0.7
Pacific ex Japan	6.2	5.9
Canada	4.9	8.1
Emerging Markets	20.3	33.5



"HL": International Equity ADR model portfolio. "Index": MSCI All Country World ex US Index. "Other": Includes companies classified in countries outside the index.

Sector and region allocations are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant International Equity ADR composite GIPS Presentation. Source: Harding Loevner International Equity ADR model, FactSet, MSCI Inc. MSCI Inc. and S&P do not make any express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any GICS data contained herein. Data as of June 30, 2026.

HL International ADR and MSCI ACWI ex US Index: IT Weight



Source: FactSet, MSCI Inc., Harding Loevner. Data as of June 30, 2026.

that balance: a continued appreciation of the companies involved combined with an incremental response to rising stock prices, fuller valuations, and greater concentration risk. Valuation is an imprecise art, but our actions demonstrate that we are relying more on comprehensive valuation work than on the more commonly cited but flawed shorthand of P/E multiples.

In the past six months, we've trimmed our holding in ASML five times, TSMC four times and Lasertec and Disco Corp three times each. In doing so, we sold 760 basis points of our IT holdings and actively managed our overweight to an underweight, despite buying back a holding in German chipmaker Infineon Technologies. Had we left those positions untouched to "run our profits," our IT weight would have been closer to 30% of the portfolio rather than its current level, exceeding our 25% sector maximum risk guideline. Our consistent trimming of individual holdings meant we never came close to breaching that guideline.

That valuation discipline has changed our portfolio level exposure to the IT sector. At the beginning of the year, over one-sixth of the portfolio's holdings (by weight) were in the IT sector, nearly a fifth more than the index weight. Semiconductor holdings comprised roughly 80% of our IT weight. With share prices of semiconductor and technology hardware companies soaring, continued trimming in the past six months still left our IT weight higher, at nearly 19%, at quarter-end, while the index weight had swelled to roughly 23%. The growing IT weight in the Index derived primarily from the spectacular rise of Korean shares of Samsung Electronics (+156% YTD) and SK hynix (+183% YTD), which we have not owned due to their absence from the ADR opportunity set—an absence that cost roughly 300bp of relative performance in this quarter alone.

Some of the proceeds from our sales of IT holdings have been deployed into companies that investors perceive, at least in part, as threatened by AI disruption. Last quarter we discussed the potential for airline reservation software network Amadeus or employment platform Recruit to use AI in their own operations before any new AI-enabled startups can dislodge them from their strong competitive positions. This quarter, we bought a new holding in Spotify, the Sweden-based (but US-listed) music and podcast streaming subscription platform, which we think is another such company.

Spotify has a global subscriber base of over 750 million users whom it is already racing to deepen engagement with faster and more profitably than existing competitors or new entrants. Spotify is using AI to offer new content discovery features, along with new products that enable users to create their own re-mixes and covers of licensed content for sharing within social groups, while preserving the original artists' rights. Despite steady user, revenue, and earnings growth, Spotify's share price has sunk along with shares of other software-based businesses, offering a better-valued entry point for investment than any time since the company turned profitable in 2024.

Spotify adds to other holdings of media or interactive services companies in the Communication Services sector that have also faced falling share prices due to fears of AI disruption. China-based internet games and platform companies NetEase and Tencent have both reported resilient user, revenue, and earnings growth. While both utilize AI in their businesses to create advantage and opportunity, neither company is among China's leading LLM labs. Scaled players are better positioned to capture the benefits, including product innovation, personalization, and cost efficiencies, while also being better equipped to mitigate the threats from new entrants and changing content economics. We believe the market is undervaluing the long-term earnings power of these companies.

Performance and Attribution

The International Equity ADR composite rose 9.5% gross of fees in the second quarter, compared with a 14.7% gain in the MSCI ACWI ex US Index. Year to date, the composite increased 10.7% gross of fees, versus 14.0% for the index.

Second Quarter 2026 Performance Attribution

International Equity ADR Composite vs. MSCI ACWI ex US Index



"OTHER": Includes companies classified in countries outside the index.

Source: Harding Loevner International Equity ADR composite, FactSet, MSCI Inc. Data as of June 30, 2026. The total effect shown here may differ from the variance of the composite performance and benchmark performance shown on the first page of this report due to the way in which FactSet calculates performance attribution. This information is supplemental to the composite GIPS Presentation.

Portfolio Attribution by Sector

Our Financials and Health Care holdings, as well as our overweight exposure to the latter sector, detracted from our relative performance. Even with a number of strong IT holdings, stock selection in the sector also detracted, while beneficial underweight allocations helped in Energy, Utilities, and Materials.

Top contributors to relative performance:

- **Information Technology** stocks were among the largest contributors even though the sector caused a drag on performance, as portfolio was hurt by the extremely strong relative performance of stocks we did not own, especially SK hynix and Samsung. Infineon Technologies, a leading provider of power management chips used throughout data centers, was the largest contributor as the company upgraded its guidance for its financial year.
- Underweight exposure in **Energy, Materials** and **Utilities,** which failed to keep pace with the index's returns, helped relative performance.
- Stock selection in **Consumer Staples** boosted performance. FEMSA rallied after better-than-expected results, which showed continuing improvement in its flagship OXXO stores.

Top detractors from relative performance:

- **Health Care** underperformed the index, and the portfolio's overweight position added to the relative shortfall. Chugai Pharmaceutical declined on the back of weak prescription data for its oral obesity drug even while the company's reported quarterly results were better than expected.
- Shell was the biggest detractor as falling oil prices, resulting from a pause in the conflict in the Middle East, created drag in investor sentiment toward the **Energy** sector.
- In **Financials** AIA Group detracted as investors became concerned that tighter cross-border account opening enforcement by regulators could slow capital flows into Hong Kong and hurt insurance sales.

Relative Returns (%)

Second Quarter 2026

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Infineon Technologies	INFT	1.5	0.3	0.72
Lasertec	INFT	2.5	0.1	0.63
ASML	INFT	3.6	1.7	0.49
Recruit	INDU	1.3	0.2	0.42
Disco Corp	INFT	2.7	0.1	0.33

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
SK hynix*	INFT	–	1.8	-1.76
Samsung Electronics*	INFT	–	2.6	-1.39
Shell	ENER	3.1	0.7	-0.83
AIA Group	FINA	2.6	0.3	-0.82
Chugai Pharmaceutical	HLTH	2.1	0.1	-0.69

Trailing 12 Months

Largest Contributors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
ASML	INFT	3.5	1.4	1.67
Disco Corp	INFT	2.9	0.1	1.29
Lasertec	INFT	1.6	<0.1	1.26
Infineon Technologies	INFT	0.4	0.2	0.80
DBS Group	FINA	3.9	0.3	0.67

Largest Detractors	Sector	Avg. Weight HL	Avg. Weight Index	Effect
Samsung Electronics*	INFT	–	1.6	-2.64
SK hynix*	INFT	–	0.9	-2.45
HDFC Bank	FINA	2.5	0.3	-1.76
Sysmex	HLTH	1.1	<0.1	-1.40
MercadoLibre	DSCR	1.6	–	-1.34

"HL": International Equity ADR composite. "Index": MSCI All Country World ex US Index.

*Company was not held in the portfolio; its absence had an impact on the portfolio's return relative to the index.

Portfolio Attribution by Region

Strong stocks in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and Canada were offset by poor stocks in Europe ex EMU and relative underperformance in Emerging Markets.

Top contributors to relative performance:

- In the **EMU**, semiconductor companies Infineon in Germany and ASML in the Netherlands contributed positively. Spanish bank BBVA also helped relative returns.
- Returns from **Canada** benefited from Manulife, which outperformed even as it reported first-quarter earnings slightly behind consensus. Investors may have been drawn to the strength of its performance in Asia, which saw a sizable year-over-year increase in earnings.

Top detractors from relative performance:

- **Europe ex EMU** was the largest detractor as Shell, BAE Systems, and Haleon weighed on returns. BAE's strong 2026 sales guidance was not enough to overcome the broader sell-off in European defense stocks after the pause of the conflict in the Middle East. Haleon reported slow first-quarter growth after a weaker-than-expected cold and flu season.
- **Emerging Markets** detracted, primarily due to the strong relative performance of SK hynix and Samsung, which we did not own in the portfolio. Also, strong contributions from Taiwan's TSMC did not overcome the portfolio's lack of exposure to other Taiwanese semiconductor stocks that performed even better.

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Portfolio Holdings

Communication Services	Market	End Wt. (%)
NetEase Gaming and internet services	China	1.2
Spotify Digital streaming platform	Sweden	1.2
Telkom Indonesia Telecom services	Indonesia	0.6
Tencent Internet and IT services	China	2.5
Consumer Discretionary		
Amadeus Global distribution systems operator	Spain	1.8
Compass Group Contract food services	UK	1.3
Haier Smart Home Consumer appliances mfr.	China	0.8
MercadoLibre E-commerce retailer	US	1.2
Sea Limited E-commerce retailer	Singapore	0.7
Sony Japanese conglomerate	Japan	1.5
Consumer Staples		
FEMSA Beverages manufacturer and retail operator	Mexico	3.0
L'Oréal Cosmetics manufacturer	France	1.8
Unicharm Consumer products manufacturer	Japan	0.6
Energy		
Shell Oil and gas producer	UK	2.7
Financials		
Adyen Payment processing services	Netherlands	0.5
AIA Group Insurance provider	Hong Kong	2.2
Allianz Financial services and insurance provider	Germany	3.4
BBVA Commercial bank	Spain	2.6
Credicorp Commercial bank	Peru	1.9
DBS Group Commercial bank	Singapore	2.2
GF Banorte Commercial bank	Mexico	1.1
HDFC Bank Commercial bank	India	0.9
Manulife Financial services and insurance provider	Canada	2.8
Ping An Insurance Insurance provider	China	0.8
Health Care		
AstraZeneca Pharma and biotech manufacturer	UK	1.0
Chugai Pharmaceutical Pharma manufacturer	Japan	1.9
Genmab Oncology drug manufacturer	Denmark	1.1
Haleon Consumer health products manufacturer	UK	1.7
M3 Medical information services	Japan	1.3
Novartis Pharma manufacturer	Switzerland	1.1
Roche Pharma and diagnostic equipment manufacturer	Switzerland	2.1

Health Care	Market	End Wt. (%)
Shionogi Pharma manufacturer	Japan	0.9
Sonova Hearing aids manufacturer	Switzerland	0.6
Sysmex Clinical laboratory equipment manufacturer	Japan	0.8
Industrials		
Alfa Laval Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	1.7
ASSA ABLOY Security equipment manufacturer	Sweden	1.1
Atlas Copco Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	1.0
BAE Systems Aerospace and defense manufacturer	UK	2.0
Canadian National Railway Railway operator	Canada	2.1
CATL Battery systems manufacturer	China	2.5
Daifuku Material-handling equipment manufacturer	Japan	1.4
Epiroc Industrial equipment manufacturer	Sweden	1.6
Recruit HR technology platform provider	Japan	1.6
Ryanair Airline operator	Ireland	1.0
Safran Aerospace parts manufacturer	France	1.1
Schneider Electric Energy management products	France	3.2
SF Holding Delivery services	China	0.6
Techtronic Industries Power tools manufacturer	Hong Kong	1.0
Information Technology		
ASML Semiconductor equipment manufacturer	Netherlands	4.0
Dassault Systèmes CAD software developer	France	0.5
Disco Corp Precision tool manufacturer	Japan	2.9
Infineon Technologies Semiconductor manufacturer	Germany	1.8
Lasertec Semiconductor equipment manufacturer	Japan	2.6
NICE Enterprise software developer	Israel	1.2
OBIC Enterprise software and IT services provider	Japan	1.4
TSMC Semiconductor manufacturer	Taiwan	4.5
Materials		
Air Liquide Industrial gases supplier	France	1.1
Rio Tinto Mineral miner and processor	UK	2.3
Symrise Fragrances and flavors manufacturer	Germany	0.9
Real Estate		
No Holdings		
Utilities		
No Holdings		
Cash		3.1

Model portfolio holdings are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant International Equity ADR composite GIPS Presentation. The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings shown may not be current. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. It should not be assumed that investment in the security identified has been or will be profitable. To request a complete list of portfolio holdings for the past year contact Harding Loevner.

Portfolio Facts

Quality and Growth	HL	Index
Profit Margin[1] (%)	15.1	13.3
Return on Assets[1] (%)	9.0	6.3
Return on Equity[1] (%)	18.7	15.2
Debt/Equity Ratio[1] (%)	43.6	56.7
Std. Dev. of 5 Year ROE[1] (%)	3.7	4.9
Sales Growth[1,2] (%)	9.5	9.6
Earnings Growth[1,2] (%)	14.0	14.9
Cash Flow Growth[1,2] (%)	11.2	9.3
Dividend Growth[1,2] (%)	11.6	9.8

Size and Turnover	HL	Index
Wtd. Median Mkt. Cap. (US $B)	94.3	82.3
Wtd. Avg. Mkt. Cap. (US $B)	223.7	276.2
Turnover[3] (Annual %)	16.8	–

Risk and Valuation	HL	Index
Alpha[2] (%)	-2.47	–
Beta[2]	0.98	–
R-Squared[2]	0.86	–
Active Share[3] (%)	85	–
Standard Deviation[2] (%)	16.31	15.42
Sharpe Ratio[2]	0.16	0.37
Tracking Error[2] (%)	6.1	–
Information Ratio[2]	-0.49	–
Up/Down Capture[2]	95/108	–
Price/Earnings[4]	21.2	18.6
Price/Cash Flow[4]	15.5	12.5
Price/Book[4]	3.6	2.5
Dividend Yield[5] (%)	2.1	2.3

[1]Weighted median. [2]Trailing five years, annualized. [3]Five-year average. [4]Weighted harmonic mean. [5]Weighted mean. Source: (Risk characteristics) Harding Loevner International Equity ADR composite based on the composite returns, gross of fees, eVestment Alliance LLC, MSCI Inc. Source: (other characteristics) Harding Loevner International Equity ADR model based on the underlying holdings, FactSet (Run Date: July 6, 2026) based on the latest available data in FactSet on this date), MSCI Inc.

Completed Portfolio Transactions

Holdings Established	Market	Sector
Spotify	Sweden	COMM

Holdings Sold	Market	Sector
Adyen	Netherlands	FINA

The portfolio is actively managed therefore holdings identified above do not represent all of the securities held in the portfolio and holdings may not be current. It should not be assumed that investment in the securities identified has been or will be profitable. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Portfolio characteristics are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant International Equity ADR composite GIPS Presentation. Portfolio holdings should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security.

Composite Performance

as of June 30, 2026

	HL Intl. ADR Gross (%)	HL Intl. ADR Net (%)	MSCI ACWI ex US[1] (%)	MSCI EAFE[2] (%)	HL Intl. ADR 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	MSCI ACWI ex US 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	MSCI EAFE 3-yr. Std. Deviation[3] (%)	Internal Dispersion[4] (%)	No. of Accounts[5]	Composite Assets[5] ($M)	Strategy Advisory Only Assets ($M)	Firm Assets ($M)
2026 YTD[6]	10.69	10.37	14.01	9.84	12.68	13.70	13.27	N.A.	127	832	8,052	30,836
2025	22.02	21.26	33.11	31.89	12.77	11.56	11.94	1.4	150	906	7,902	32,260
2024	3.53	2.84	6.09	4.35	18.80	16.01	16.61	0.3	187	1,087	7,357	35,471
2023	17.26	16.47	16.21	18.85	18.75	16.06	16.60	0.7	211	1,156	7,870	43,924
2022	-19.20	-19.76	-15.57	-14.01	20.80	19.24	19.95	0.3	225	1,069	7,329	47,607
2021	10.07	9.35	8.29	11.78	16.63	16.77	16.89	0.6	203	1,239	10,035	75,084
2020	21.14	20.33	11.13	8.28	18.09	17.92	17.87	0.5	172	1,115	8,707	74,496
2019	23.56	22.71	22.13	22.66	12.35	11.33	10.80	0.5	187	985	7,952	64,306
2018	-13.36	-13.96	-13.78	-13.36	11.84	11.40	11.27	0.9	196	851	6,881	49,892
2017	29.66	28.79	27.77	25.62	11.93	11.88	11.85	0.7	167	903	8,098	54,003
2016	4.32	3.58	5.01	1.51	12.80	12.53	12.48	0.2	165	680	5,618	38,996

[1]Benchmark index. [2]Supplemental index. [3]Variability of the composite, gross of fees, and the index returns over the preceding 36-month period, annualized. [4]Asset-weighted standard deviation (gross of fees). [5]Total product accounts and assets are 22,051 and $11,979 million, respectively, at June 30, 2026, and include both separately managed and advisory-only assets. [6]The 2026 YTD returns and assets shown are preliminary. N.A.–Internal dispersion less than a 12-month period. Strategy Advisory Only Assets and total product accounts and assets are supplemental information.

The International Equity ADR composite contains fully discretionary, fee-paying accounts investing in non-US equity and equity-equivalent securities and cash reserves. Securities are held in Depository Receipt (DR) form, including American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs), or are otherwise traded on US exchanges. For comparison purposes the composite return is measured against the MSCI All Country World ex US Total Return Index. The exchange rate source of the benchmark is Reuters. The exchange rate source of the composite is Bloomberg. Additional information about the benchmark, including the percentage of composite assets invested in countries or regions not included in the benchmark, is available upon request.

The MSCI All Country World ex US Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure equity market performance in the global developed and emerging markets, excluding the US. The index consists of 46 developed and emerging market countries. The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure developed market equity performance, excluding the US and Canada. The index consists of 21 developed market countries. You cannot invest directly in these indexes.

Harding Loevner LP claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Harding Loevner has been independently verified for the period November 1, 1989 through March 31, 2026.

A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The International Equity ADR composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1990, through March 31, 2026. The verification and performance examination report is available upon request. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Harding Loevner LP is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Harding Loevner is an affiliate of AMG (NYSE: AMG), an investment holding company with stakes in a diverse group of boutique firms. A list of composite descriptions, a list of limited distribution pooled fund descriptions, and a list of broad distribution pooled funds are available upon request.

Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite performance is presented gross of withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains for certain portfolios within the composite and net of withholding for others. Additional information is available upon request. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request.

The US dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented both gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net returns are calculated using actual fees. Actual returns will be reduced by investment advisory fees and other expenses that may be incurred in the management of the account. The standard fee schedule generally applied to separate International Equity ADR accounts is 0.80% annually of the market value for the first $20 million; 0.40% above $20 million. Refer to Part 2A of our Form ADV for more details regarding our fees. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year.

The International Equity ADR composite was created on August 31, 2000 and the performance inception date is December 31, 1989.

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